Countervailing incentives in agency problems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Countervailing incentives in agency problems
zbMATH Open document ID: 0682.90015
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5
author: Tracy R. Lewis
author: David E. M. Sappington
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 4118110
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg leader
zbMATH Keywords: countervailing incentives
zbMATH Keywords: agency problem
zbMATH Keywords: private information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(89)90083-5
OpenAlex ID: W2009088207
cites work: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
cites work: Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
cites work: Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
cites work: Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages
cites work: Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4118110