On the indices of zeros of Nash fields
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the indices of zeros of Nash fields
zbMATH Open document ID: 0979.91008
author: Fabrizio Germano
author: Stefano De Michelis
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-02-25T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors consider dynamics defined on a finite normal form game \(G\), whose zeros include the Nash equilibria of \(G\). The paper shows that for a wide class of dynamics, including the replicator dynamics, local stability of zeros are determined by the geometry of the Nash correspondence. Thus, one has deeper linkages between evolutionary game theory, refinements of Nash equilibrium, and the geometry of the Nash equilibrium.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 37N40
zbMATH DE Number: 1569408
zbMATH Keywords: index dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: geometry of equilibrium correspondence
zbMATH Keywords: local stability of zeros
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Keywords: refinements of Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: geometry of Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2000.2669
OpenAlex ID: W2037635907
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2000.2669
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1569408