Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1027.91032
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00018-6
author: Ezra Einy
author: Ori Haimanko
author: Ram Orzach
author: Aner Sela
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2002-12-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1839109
zbMATH Keywords: Common-value second-price auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Differential information
zbMATH Keywords: Dominance solvability
zbMATH Keywords: Sophisticated equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: Information advantage
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
cites work: A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
cites work: Bayesian Implementation
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
cites work: A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1839109