Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
zbMATH Open document ID: 1018.91003
author: Nejat Anbarci
author: Stergios Skaperdas
author: Constantinos Syropoulos
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-12-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1845938
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: division rules
zbMATH Keywords: variable utility possibilities set
zbMATH Keywords: variable threat payoffs
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2001609248
cites work: Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
cites work: Conflict and distribution
cites work: Analysis of a family of two-person bargaining games with incomplete information
cites work: Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
cites work: Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
cites work: Q3993509
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
cites work: Two-Person Cooperative Games
cites work: A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
cites work: Q4004282
cites work: Power in a Theory of the Firm
cites work: Axiomatic models of bargaining
cites work: Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
cites work: Q4945845
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2828
Recommended article: A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict: The genesis of bargaining power
Recommended article: Commitments to threat strategies in Nash bargaining
Recommended article: Bargaining with asymmetric threat points
Recommended article: An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining
Recommended article: Q4664827
Recommended article: Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs
Recommended article: Bargaining in economic and ethical environments. An experimental study and normative solution concepts
Recommended article: Delegation and threat in bargaining
Recommended article: Extending the theory of conflict equilibria
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1845938