On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1022.91036
author: Patrick W. Schmitz
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-12-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
zbMATH DE Number: 1845946
zbMATH Keywords: licenses
zbMATH Keywords: innovation
zbMATH Keywords: monopoly
zbMATH Keywords: private information
Wikidata QID: Q29544424
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3122560212
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DBLP publication ID: journals/jet/Schmitz02
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2863
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1845946