A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures
zbMATH Open document ID: 1028.91017
author: Donald E. Campbell
author: Jerry S. Kelly
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-01-26T00:00:00Z
review text: A social choice function associates a nonempty subset of the set of alternatives to a profile of individual linear orderings. Strategy-proofness is adapted to this set-function framework. It is shown that for a strategy-proof set-function, there is a positive integer \(k\) such that either (i) the selected subsets for all profiles have the same cardinality \(k\) and there is an individual \(i\) such that this selected subset of \(k\) alternatives coincide with his \(k\) highest ranked alternatives, or (ii) all subsets of cardinality 1 to \(k\) are chosen and there is a group of \(k\) individuals such that the selected subset is the union of the alternatives ranked first by these individuals. There does not exist a strategy-proof set-function such that the selected subsets are all of cardinality \(k^*\) with \(1< k^*< k\).
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1850402
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: leximin
reviewed by: Maurice Salles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-001-0239-6
OpenAlex ID: W2063083462
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-001-0239-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1850402