Channel coordination over time: Incentive equilibria and credibility
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Channel coordination over time: Incentive equilibria and credibility
zbMATH Open document ID: 1023.91035
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00072-0
author: Steffen Jørgensen
author: Georges Zaccour
publication date: 2003-01-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
zbMATH DE Number: 1856541
zbMATH Keywords: channel of distribution
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic game
zbMATH Keywords: perfect information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0165-1889(01)00072-0
OpenAlex ID: W1985833622
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1856541