Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1040.91034
DOI: 10.1016/S0096-3003(01)00175-8
author: Takehiro Inohara
published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation
publication date: 2003-01-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1861196
zbMATH Keywords: Committees
zbMATH Keywords: Simple games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: On conditions for a meeting not to reach a deadlock
cites work: Q3677437
cites work: New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
full work available at URL: s0096-3003(01)00175-8
OpenAlex ID: W2109463843
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1861196