Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1049.91036
author: Lars Ehlers
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2003-07-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 1885639
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s100580200076
OpenAlex ID: W1990515691
DOI: 10.1007/S100580200076
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1885639