Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: The role of beliefs.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: The role of beliefs.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1042.91002
author: Antoine Billot
author: Alain Chateauneuf
author: Itzhak Gilboa
author: Jean-Marc Tallon
published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance
publication date: 2002-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper considers the Nash bargaining problem when the outcome is uncertain and agents do not have a common prior over than uncertainty. Both the risk neutral and the constant absolute risk aversion cases are studied. The main comparative statics result is that if the agent 1's beliefs move further away from agent 2's, then agent 2 is made better off.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1885715
zbMATH Keywords: Nash bargain
zbMATH Keywords: uncertain outcome
zbMATH Keywords: common prior
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s102030200002
OpenAlex ID: W3123322346
DOI: 10.1007/S102030200002
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1885715