Efficient mechanisms for a partially public good.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient mechanisms for a partially public good.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1040.91044
author: Domenico Menicucci
published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance
publication date: 2002-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper deals with the problem of designing a mechanism to allocate efficiently a partially public good when each buyer (the seller) privately observes her own valuation (production cost) for the object. The good is partially public in the following sense: if buyer \(i\) receives the item, then her gross surplus increases and also the gross surplus of any other buyer \(j \neq i\) rises, but the latter increase is less than if buyer \(j\) obtained the good. A probability model is considered. Sufficient conditions ensuring the existence of an efficient mechanism for any probability distribution are obtained.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 1885718
zbMATH Keywords: surplus
zbMATH Keywords: probability model
reviewed by: Ernst G. Al'brekht
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s102030200005
OpenAlex ID: W2050191773
DOI: 10.1007/S102030200005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1885718