On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1036.91009
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020240214900
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2003-03-12T00:00:00Z
review text: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every nondictatorial social choice function is manipulable, but does not quantify that manipulability. Every manipulable social choice function is unstable and here the author shows that unstable rules based on either the majority relation or a faithful scoring rule have simple combinatorics. In both cases, the author proves by combinatorial arguments that there is an upper bound on the proportion of unstable profiles of the form \(O(1/\sqrt{n})\), where \(n\) is the number of voters. Together with other results in the area, this shows that all classical social choice rules are asymptotically non-manipulable.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1880549
zbMATH Keywords: majority relation
zbMATH Keywords: scoring rule
zbMATH Keywords: asymptotic strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: manipulability
author: Arkadii Slinko
reviewed by: Duncan J. Melville
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: a:1020240214900
OpenAlex ID: W1526942341
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1880549