Chores.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Chores.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1038.91025
author: Chantale LaCasse
author: Clara Ponsatí
author: Vicky Barham
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-03-23T00:00:00Z
review text: In this paper are analysed situations where the provision of each of \(c\) public goods has to be voluntarily assumed by exactly one of \(n\) private agents in the absence of transfer schemes or binding contracts. The problem is modeled as a complete information, potentially infinite horizon game where \(n\) agents simultaneously wage \(c\) wars of attrition. Providing a public good commits an agent not to take on the provision of another public good for a fixed period. It is explored the strategic trade-offs that this commitment ability and the multiplicit of tasks provide. Subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) are characterized completely for games with two agents and two public goods. For games with two identical agents and \(c- 1\) identical public goods it is established that an equilibrium that yields a surplus-maximizing outcome always exists and there are proved sufficient conditions under which it is the unique equilibrium outcome. Under mild conditions, the surplus-maximizing SPE is the unique symmetric SPE.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 1886671
zbMATH Keywords: discrete-time game
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
reviewed by: Stefan Mititelu
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.2001.0899
OpenAlex ID: W4234419312
cites work: The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
cites work: The war of attrition with incomplete information
cites work: Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.2001.0899
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1886671