The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1092.91505
author: George J. Mailath
author: Ichiro Obara
author: Tadashi Sekiguchi
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-03-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 1886679
zbMATH Keywords: repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium payoffs
zbMATH Keywords: perfect
zbMATH Keywords: monitoring
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.2001.0901
OpenAlex ID: W3122428915
cites work: Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
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cites work: Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames
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cites work: Q3996430
cites work: On Repeated Games with Complete Information
cites work: The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
cites work: Q4002161
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.2001.0901
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1886679