An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1033.91018
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00002-7
author: Ana B. Ania
author: Thomas Tröger
author: Achim Wambach
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-03-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
zbMATH DE Number: 1886681
zbMATH Keywords: Insurance markets
zbMATH Keywords: Adverse selection
zbMATH Keywords: Bounded rationality
zbMATH Keywords: Imitation
zbMATH Keywords: Local experiments
zbMATH Keywords: Stochastic stability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1886681