Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1092.91506
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00008-8
author: Tadashi Sekiguchi
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-03-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1886686
zbMATH Keywords: Repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: Private information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
cites work: Commitment and observability in games
cites work: Finitely Repeated Games
cites work: Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
cites work: Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
cites work: A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
cites work: Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
cites work: Belief-based refinements in signalling games
cites work: On stability of perfect equilibrium points
cites work: The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
cites work: Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
cites work: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1886686