A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1032.91026
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00005-2
author: Andres Perea
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-03-23T00:00:00Z
review text: The main aim of this research note is to establish and apply a characterization of the phenomenon that a stream of locally optimal decisions represents a globally optimal decisions stream, named as the one-deviation property or the one-shot deviation principle, under the appropriate weakening of preconsistency represented by the updating consistency. The result which characterizes the assessments which satisfy the one-deviation property is applied also in the context of the updating systems. The significant references suggest the corresponding extension to the equilibria of the dynamical systems.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 1886687
zbMATH Keywords: extensive form game
zbMATH Keywords: deviation property
zbMATH Keywords: rationality
zbMATH Keywords: rationalizability
zbMATH Keywords: updating system
reviewed by: Vasile Postolică
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0899-8256(02)00005-2
OpenAlex ID: W2019516193
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1886687