Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1032.91027
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00502-X
author: Sergiu Hart
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-03-23T00:00:00Z
review text: This research paper deals with the finite games of finite perfect information, a class of games in extensive form where the complete description is given, exactly specifying the rules, the order of moves, the information for the players and so on, under the assumption that the backward induction equilibrium is unique. The author presents the corresponding model, the associated population game and the evolutoinary dynamics significant main results, proofs and remarks, important connections with the existing references and possible extensions of the results established here: non-unique backward induction equilibrium, multiple agents and non-distinct populations, games with imperfect information, other selection dynamics, convergence and the order of limits.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 1886691
zbMATH Keywords: games in extensive form
zbMATH Keywords: games of perfect information
zbMATH Keywords: backward induction
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: subgame-perfect equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary stability
zbMATH Keywords: mutation
zbMATH Keywords: selection
zbMATH Keywords: population games
zbMATH Keywords: induction equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium state
reviewed by: Vasile Postolică
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0899-8256(02)00502-x
OpenAlex ID: W2157815725
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1886691