Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1037.91008
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00500-6
author: Eiichi Miyagawa
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-03-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 1886693
zbMATH Keywords: Mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: Nash program
zbMATH Keywords: Alternating offers
zbMATH Keywords: Complete information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1886693