Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1031.91014
author: Michael Kosfeld
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-03-25T00:00:00Z
review text: A model of equilibrium selection in coordination games is studied, where the agents from an infinite population stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing a perturbed best-response, it is assumed that the agents follow a rule of switching to better strategies with higher probability. Moreover, the agents stay with their strategy in case they successfully coordinate with their local neighbors. The main result is that both strict Nash equilibria of the coordination game correspond to invariant distributions of the process. Hence evolution of the play is not ergodic but instead depends on the initial conditions.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 1887570
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: coordination game
zbMATH Keywords: evolution
zbMATH Keywords: strategy adjustment
reviewed by: Giacomo Bonanno
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001990100223
OpenAlex ID: W1990587946
DOI: 10.1007/S001990100223
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1887570