Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1042.91005
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2002-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors discuss market games or linear production games with a large finite set of agents. The representing distributions of initial assignments are assumed to be uniform distributions with disjoint carriers. Thus, the agents decompose into finitely many disjoint groups where each holds a corner of the market. The authors argue that the formation of cartels should be explained endogenously by following a paper of \textit{S. Hart} [J. Econ. Theory 7, 453-466 (1974)]. Accordingly, they present a solution concept of modified nucleolus (or modiclus) that not only predicts cartelization but also explains the profits of the long side by its preventive power.
reviewed by: Samir Kumar Neogy
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1890466
zbMATH Keywords: cartels
zbMATH Keywords: glove game
zbMATH Keywords: modiclus
zbMATH Keywords: nucleolus
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
author: Joachim Rosenmüller
author: Peter Sudhölter
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s007120200041
OpenAlex ID: W186977954
DOI: 10.1007/S007120200041
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1890466