Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1032.91090
author: Shigehiro Serizawa
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: Clearly, reading the title of this paper recalls an old result of Hurwicz, which he had proved in 1972 for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods. The aim of this paper is, to extend this result to any finite number of agents and goods. In an introduction the author explains carefully the situation in this field. Then a long and not so easy proof follows (with a lot of hints and remarks). Shortly said, he proved, that for pure exchange economies with any number of agents and goods there is no strategy-proof Pareto-efficient and individually rational (or symmetric) rule on the class of classical, homothetic and smooth preferences. The paper is completed by a hint to Zhou's conjecture (concerning non-inversely-dictatorial rules).
reviewed by: Alfred Göpfert
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C29
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1891518
zbMATH Keywords: pure exchange economies
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto-efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: symmetry
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2002.2940
OpenAlex ID: W1984286389
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2002.2940
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891518