Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1038.91010
author: Suresh Mutuswami
author: Eyal Winter
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: The purpose of this paper is to examine a model of network formation with costs where individual benefits from network formation are not known to the planner. A number of theorems and explanations is made for establishment of the proposed model. No numerical experiments are performed.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
zbMATH DE Number: 1891519
zbMATH Keywords: Networks mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: model
zbMATH Keywords: planner
zbMATH Keywords: payoffs
reviewed by: Prabhat Kumar Mahanti
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2137714003
cites work: Q3197645
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2920
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891519