Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1035.91006
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: The author proposes a solution for the evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities. A number of theorems and proofs are developed for the theoritical foundation. No numerical experiments are performed. The developed model could be used for experimentation in future.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D10
zbMATH DE Number: 1891521
zbMATH Keywords: evolution
zbMATH Keywords: mutation rates
zbMATH Keywords: mistakes
author: Eric van Damme
author: Jörgen W. Weibull
reviewed by: Prabhat Kumar Mahanti
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2100839242
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2941
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891521