Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1038.91013
author: Pierpaolo Battigalli
author: Marciano Siniscalchi
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. They suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes. They define a concept of strong belief and provide an epistemic characterization, and sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome in generic games with perfect information.
reviewed by: Mariano Ruiz Espejo
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 1891523
zbMATH Keywords: conditional belief
zbMATH Keywords: strong belief
zbMATH Keywords: forward induction
zbMATH Keywords: rationalizability
zbMATH Keywords: intuitive
zbMATH Keywords: criterion.
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2038925917
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2942
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891523