Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1038.91032
author: Arunava Sen
author: Bhaskar Dutta
author: Hans Peters
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper is devoted to public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of the Euclidean space. Such type of economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of the reported preferences. The authors establish that any strategy-proof and strictly unanimous probabilistic mechanism has to be a random dictatorship. The random dictatorship from unanimity and strategy-proofness derives for the case of two agents. The \(n\)-agents result is derived by mathematical induction based on the two-agent result.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 1891524
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
zbMATH Keywords: strategy- proofness
zbMATH Keywords: probabilistic mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: welfare loss
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2001.2896
OpenAlex ID: W2098229119
cites work: Q4191811
cites work: Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
cites work: Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
cites work: A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
cites work: Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
cites work: The categorical approach to social choice theory
cites work: Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
cites work: Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
cites work: Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic
cites work: An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result
cites work: Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
cites work: Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2896
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891524