Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1033.91001
author: Christian Hellwig
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: The author considers games with incomplete information and investigates equilibrium convergence as the level of noise in the information structure vanishes. Conditions of such convergence to common knowledge equilibria, which depend on the relations between public and private signals, are established.
reviewed by: Igor V. Konnov
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 1891537
zbMATH Keywords: global games
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium convergence
zbMATH Keywords: common knowledge
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2002.2947
OpenAlex ID: W2032000314
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2002.2947
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891537