On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1035.91017
author: Jörg Oechssler
author: Frank Riedel
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4046
review text: This paper proposes a new solution concept in game theory, evolutionary robustness. A population is evolutionarily robust if it obtains a higher than average payoff against all possible payoffs which are close in the weak topology. Evolutionary robustness implies uninvadability, and the concepts of a continuous stable strategy (CSS) and a neighborhood invader strategy (NIS). These concepts do not guarantee dynamical stability (Lyapunov stability) for continuous strategy spaces, but evolutionary robustness is shown here to do so for replicator dynamics in symmetric 2-person games.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 1891538
zbMATH Keywords: replicator dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary stability
zbMATH Keywords: ESS
zbMATH Keywords: CSS
reviewed by: Ki Hang Kim
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1992533362
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2950
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891538