\(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1033.91002
author: Daisuke Oyama
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: The author considers a class of evolutionary games with perfect foresight dynamics. A continuum of identical players is repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric \(n \times n\) game. Time instants at which each player can switch actions follow a Poisson process, i.e. there are frictions in the game. The author establishes equivalence between linear stability and \(p\)-dominance of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium under a small friction and shows that \(p\)-dominance represents a sufficient condition for other stability concepts (accessible and absorbing equilibria) under similar assumptions. Some existence results for stability concepts are also presented in the set-valued case.
reviewed by: Igor V. Konnov
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A07
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1891540
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: perfect foresight dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: \(p\)-dominance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2001.2955
OpenAlex ID: W2122229300
cites work: Q3324260
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2955
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891540