Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1036.91014
author: Richard D. McKelvey
author: Talbot Page
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors consider the problem of bilateral trade of a divisible good, when there is two-sided incomplete information about the valuations. More specifically, they study whether in such a case, there will be inefficiencies, and if so, whether there is any bias in the direction that outcomes tend to deviate from the efficient allocation. They start from the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem and its corollary that identify conditions under which bilateral trading leads to inefficiency. They generalise this theorem, investigate the existence of bias when there is no efficient equilibrium, and apply the results to the Coase theorem.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 1891542
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: property rights
zbMATH Keywords: private information
reviewed by: Vangelis Grigoroudis
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2001.2954
OpenAlex ID: W2037198697
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2954
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891542