Sharing rules in teams.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sharing rules in teams.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1039.91009
author: Shasikanta Nandeibam
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: The article deals with the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in a team situation. The author assures that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place. The main result shows that, given an outcome which is noncooperatively implementable, it can be realized by a Nash equilibrium of the game played in production conditional on a simple linear sharing rule. It is also shown that when there is limited liability, the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules. As a consequence of the linear sharing rule result, the author also characterizes implementable outcomes.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1891545
zbMATH Keywords: team
zbMATH Keywords: share function
zbMATH Keywords: sharing rule
zbMATH Keywords: linear sharing rule
zbMATH Keywords: implementation.
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2001.2953
OpenAlex ID: W1967957654
cites work: Efficiency in partnerships
cites work: Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2953
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891545