Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1033.91029
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00073-3
author: Françoise Forges
author: Enrico Minelli
author: Rajiv Vohra
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1891736
zbMATH Keywords: Core
zbMATH Keywords: Asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: Incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: Exchange economy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0304-4068(02)00073-3
OpenAlex ID: W2160038824
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891736