Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
It is known [see, for example, \textit{M. Jackson}, A crash course in implementation theory, Caltech, mimeo], that the objective of implementation theory is to characterize the set of social choice correspondences that are obtainable as equilibrium outcomes when individuals interact through some game-form making strategic use of their knowledge. In the present paper, the implementation problems are studied in a complete information pure exchange economy, making use of a feasible strategic market mechanism that does not rely on the use of any integer game. The solution concepts used are the following: Nash, semi-strong Nash, coalition-proof Nash, coalition-proof correlated (with and without transfers), and correlated semi-strong equilibria (with and without transfers). It is assumed in the paper, that the mechanism designer ignores the preferences of the agents but knows their initial endowments. To avoid a problem which is not Maskin monotonic [ see \textit{M. Jackson} (1999)] and hence not Nash implementable, the paper requires that all the players strictly prefer their initial endowments to any allocation on the boundary of their consumption set. It is also observed, that the Nash equilibria of their mechanism fully implement the constrained Walrasian equilibria under weaker conditions on the initial endowments than those required to implement the Walrasian equilibria.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891754
scientific article