Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1033.91024
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00077-0
author: Gaël Giraud
author: Céline Rochon
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: It is known [see, for example, \textit{M. Jackson}, A crash course in implementation theory, Caltech, mimeo], that the objective of implementation theory is to characterize the set of social choice correspondences that are obtainable as equilibrium outcomes when individuals interact through some game-form making strategic use of their knowledge. In the present paper, the implementation problems are studied in a complete information pure exchange economy, making use of a feasible strategic market mechanism that does not rely on the use of any integer game. The solution concepts used are the following: Nash, semi-strong Nash, coalition-proof Nash, coalition-proof correlated (with and without transfers), and correlated semi-strong equilibria (with and without transfers). It is assumed in the paper, that the mechanism designer ignores the preferences of the agents but knows their initial endowments. To avoid a problem which is not Maskin monotonic [ see \textit{M. Jackson} (1999)] and hence not Nash implementable, the paper requires that all the players strictly prefer their initial endowments to any allocation on the boundary of their consumption set. It is also observed, that the Nash equilibria of their mechanism fully implement the constrained Walrasian equilibria under weaker conditions on the initial endowments than those required to implement the Walrasian equilibria.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B52
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1891754
zbMATH Keywords: coalition-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: correlation
zbMATH Keywords: semi-strong equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibria
reviewed by: Anatoliy Swishchuk
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0304-4068(02)00077-0
OpenAlex ID: W1994908980
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891754