Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
zbMATH Open document ID: 1021.91003
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00078-6
author: Anindya Bhattacharya
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1891770
zbMATH Keywords: proper simple games
zbMATH Keywords: credibly consistent sets
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0165-4896(01)00078-6
OpenAlex ID: W2031341875
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891770