Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
zbMATH Open document ID: 1021.91015
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00087-7
author: M. Remzi Sanver
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1891777
zbMATH Keywords: scoring rules
zbMATH Keywords: respecting majority
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3332693
cites work: Q3993509
cites work: The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
full work available at URL: s0165-4896(01)00087-7
OpenAlex ID: W2087230758
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891777