Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1023.91005
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00089-0
author: Licun Xue
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1891779
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: renegotiation
zbMATH Keywords: agreements
zbMATH Keywords: coalitions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891779