On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1027.91006
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00011-2
author: Geir B. Asheim
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 1891805
zbMATH Keywords: Backward induction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891805