Farsighted stability in average return games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Farsighted stability in average return games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1032.91011
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00013-6
author: Takeshi Masuda
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: che author considers a production economy with a commonly owned production process. In an average return game for such an economy, each agent chooses his input contribution and the total output is distributed proportional to the individual input contributions. He examines two notions of stability on strategy profiles in an average return game: A farsighted stable set and the largest consistent set. It is shown that every farsighted stable set is essentially a singleton and it is contained in the set of Pareto efficient strategy profiles. By contrast the largest consistent set is so large as to contain also Pareto inefficient strategy profiles, i.e., it is equal to the set of individually rational strategy profiles.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
zbMATH DE Number: 1891808
zbMATH Keywords: Average return game
zbMATH Keywords: Farsighted stable set
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: largest consistent set
zbMATH Keywords: Individual rationality
reviewed by: Marian Matłoka
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Farsighted coalitional stability
cites work: Q3378952
cites work: An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
cites work: Q5821521
cites work: On the uniqueness of equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and other games
cites work: Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
full work available at URL: s0165-4896(02)00013-6
OpenAlex ID: W2055054781
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891808