Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1039.91016
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00037-9
author: Yoshikatsu Tatamitani
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2003-04-02T00:00:00Z
review text: In a self-relevant mechanism, each agent announces only his own preference together with an outcome and an agent index. In this paper, the author examines implementability of well-known social choice correspondences by self-relevant mechanisms and reviews some previous results in the Nash implementation problem from the view point of self-relevancy or informational decentralization on mechanisms.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1891813
reviewed by: Maurice Salles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1891813