Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1073.91022
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5
author: Gadi Fibich
author: Arieh Gavious
author: Aner Sela
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-08-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 2093751
zbMATH Keywords: Asymmetric auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Revenue equivalence
zbMATH Keywords: Perturbation analysis
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
cites work: Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
cites work: All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
cites work: Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
cites work: Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
cites work: Asymmetric Auctions
cites work: Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2093751