Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1094.91049
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00184-4
author: Federico Echenique
author: Jorge Oviedo
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-08-20T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper deals with the many-to-one matchings that are in the core. The core of many-to-one matchings are characterized as fixed points of a certain map. Such a characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. This characterization of core many-to-one matchings does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. In the case when preferences are substitutable, the characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings. Also it gives an algorithm for computing the join and meet of two core matchings. The algorithm is illustrated by an example.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 2093754
zbMATH Keywords: lattice
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: algorithm
zbMATH Keywords: complexity
zbMATH Keywords: substitutability
zbMATH Keywords: Tarski's fixed point theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00184-4
OpenAlex ID: W4213020422
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2093754