Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1073.91047
author: Cl. d'Aspremont
author: Jacques Crémer
author: Louis-André Gérard-Varet
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-08-20T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: Cremer 2377.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62C10
zbMATH DE Number: 2093756
zbMATH Keywords: Mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian implementation
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian incentive compatibility
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2097612156
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2003.07.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2093756