Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1089.91062
author: Nathan C. Larson
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-08-16T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper discusses an extensive literature survey on evolution dynamics and equilibrium selection processes for large populations done by other authors. Using their idea, the authors developed models that have the features of the agent playing efficiently does not make efficient strategy to learn about or to adopt the long term prediction. The idea made is the rate at which a strategy is adopted may depend not just on its pay offs but also on how it is to learn. In this model the difficulty of learning different strategies emerges endogenously from the decisions of individual agents about who to interact with. A number of theorems and their illustration has been shown in the paper so that the reader could get the insight of the paper.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 2091392
zbMATH Keywords: coordination games
zbMATH Keywords: selective matching
zbMATH Keywords: agent
reviewed by: Prabhat Kumar Mahanti
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2003.09.007
OpenAlex ID: W1978442121
cites work: Learning from Neighbours
cites work: Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
cites work: Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
cites work: Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
cites work: Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
cites work: Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
cites work: An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
cites work: Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
cites work: Strategy-specific barriers to learning and nonmonotonic selection dynamics
cites work: The Evolution of Conventions
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2003.09.007
Recommended article: Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players
Recommended article: Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
Recommended article: Q4945845
Recommended article: Evolutionary games and matching rules
Recommended article: Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
Recommended article: Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
Recommended article: Evolutionary compromise game on assortative mixing networks
Recommended article: Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior
Recommended article: Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
Recommended article: Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2091392