A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
zbMATH Open document ID: 1070.91009
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00261-8
author: Arkadi Predtetchinski
author: P. Jean-Jacques Herings
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-08-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 2091402
zbMATH Keywords: balancedness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00261-8
OpenAlex ID: W3125789505
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2091402