Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 0827.90144
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80016-8
author: Drew Fudenberg
author: David M. Kreps
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1995-12-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91E40
zbMATH DE Number: 758339
zbMATH Keywords: extensive-form game
zbMATH Keywords: learning processes
zbMATH Keywords: self-confirming equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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cites work: Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
cites work: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
cites work: Q5817864
cites work: Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
full work available at URL: s0899-8256(05)80016-8
OpenAlex ID: W2149152713
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 758339