Subjective games and equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Subjective games and equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 0833.90143
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80019-3
author: Ehud Kalai
author: Ehud Lehrer
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1995-05-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
zbMATH DE Number: 758342
zbMATH Keywords: strategic interaction
zbMATH Keywords: subjective games
zbMATH Keywords: subjective Nash and correlated equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: multi-arm bandit games
zbMATH Keywords: repeated Cournot oligopoly games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 758342