Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
zbMATH Open document ID: 0833.90144
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80020-X
author: Alvin E. Roth
author: Ido Erev
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1995-05-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91E40
zbMATH DE Number: 758343
zbMATH Keywords: learning
zbMATH Keywords: perfect equilibria
Wikidata QID: Q42195316
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0899-8256(05)80020-x
OpenAlex ID: W2163569945
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 758343