An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
zbMATH Open document ID: 0833.90131
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80021-1
author: Reinhard Selten
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1995-05-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 758344
zbMATH Keywords: bipolar games
zbMATH Keywords: measure of risk dominance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q4885992
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cites work: Q3997197
full work available at URL: s0899-8256(05)80021-1
OpenAlex ID: W1973917352
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 758344