Evolution in mechanisms for public projects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolution in mechanisms for public projects
zbMATH Open document ID: 0831.90039
DOI: 10.1007/BF01212488
author: Roger Lagunoff
author: Akihiko Matsui
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 1995-09-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 792583
zbMATH Keywords: binary decision mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: voluntary contribution
zbMATH Keywords: majority voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics
cites work: Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
cites work: Evolutionary Games in Economics
cites work: Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
cites work: Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
cites work: Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
cites work: Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212488
OpenAlex ID: W2073465339
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 792583