Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
zbMATH Open document ID: 0851.90009
author: Shigehiro Serizawa
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1996-02-06T00:00:00Z
review text: \textit{S. Barbera}, \textit{H. Sonnenschein}, and \textit{L. Zhou} [Econometrica 59, No. 3, 595-609 (1991; Zbl 0734.90006)] introduced a restriction on the domain of individual preferences for which there exist a class of strategy-proof social choice functions, which they called voting by committees. The author gives a generalization of this restriction and shows that the restricted domain one obtains is the maximal one where voting by committees is strategy-proof except for extreme cases.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 841678
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof social choice functions
zbMATH Keywords: voting by committees
reviewed by: Maurice Salles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1995.1089
OpenAlex ID: W2050834382
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1995.1089
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 841678